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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND HIRSCHBACH,
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.

Case No. 8661

DUBUQUE PACKING CO., a corporation, and GIFFORD-WILSON.
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents deem it necessary to add the following to the .statement of facts as set forth in the brief
of appellant. The driver of the appellant's vehicle was
an employee, (R. 3), and, at the time of the .accident was
driving it in the course of his employment. (R. 10). The
statement that the respondents were negligent (App.
Br., pg. 1), and the further statement as to the amount
of damages suffered by the appellant, if any, (App. Br.
pg. 2), are wholly irrelevant and imn1aterial to this
appeal. As we se.e it, the sole issue boils down to whether,
under the facts of this case, the appellant was guilty of
negligence as a matter of law.
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STATE1IENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
THE RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
ARGU~IENT

A long and unbroken line of Utah decisions \Vell
establishes the law applicable to the facts of this case.
Although there are earlier decisions, what is generally
regarded as the leading Utah case on the subject, is
Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Prod1tcts Co., 80 Ut. 331.
15 Pac. (2d) 309, where the court quoted with approval
from the case of O'Brien vs. Alston, 61 Ut. 368, 213 Pac.
791, as follows:
"But entirely apart from any statutory requirements, the law requires that, if a person
desires to operate his automobile on the public
streets or highways after dark, he must see to it
that it is equipped with proper, suitable, and sufficient lights, so that the operator may discover
any objects or obstructions that may be encountered on the highw·ay. The law in that regard
is clearly and tersely stated in Serfas v. Lehigh,
etc., Ry. Co., 270 Pa. 306, 113 A. 370, 14 A.L.R.
791, where the court, in speaking of the duty of
the operator of an automobile to have the same
equipped with proper lights, said:

"'* * * It is the dutv of a chauffeur traveling
by night to have such ~ headlight as ·will enable
him to see in advance the face of the highway
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and to discover grade crossings, or other obstacles
in his path, in time for his O'Nll safety, and to
keep such control of his car as will enable him to
stop and avoid obstructions that fall within his
vision.' " (Emphasis Ours)
The rule expressed imposes a duty upon persons
operating vehicles on our highways at night, not only
to have the vehicle equipped with adequate lights, but
also to heed the obstructions that they see within the
range of their lights and to maintain sufficient control
of their vehicle to avoid such obstructions.
On the night of the .accident in the case at bar, the
weather was clear and visibility good. (R. 36). The view
of appellant's driver was unobstructed, (R. 33), and he
observed the parking lights of the respondents' trailer.
The appellant's driver failed to heed this clearly visible
obstruction until it was too late to avoid the collision,
(R. 36), and the .accident ensued.
In the most recent expression of this court in the
case of Fretz vs. Anderson, 5 Utah (2d) 290, 300 Pac.
( 2d) 642, the court at page 648 of that case stated:

"The rule that a motorist is normally required
to so operate his machine as to be able to see and
avoid substantial discernible objects in the road
ahead is generally recognized as is its concomitant
that the motorist must equip his machine with
proper headlights and be able to stop within the
distance of the lights' projection." (Emphasis
Ours.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

The facts of this case bring it clearly within the
operation of the .above quoted 111le. The obstruction in
the road, or the object parked on the road, respondents'
trailer, was discernible, and it was not avoided, either by
stopping or by turning aside.

vV e recognize, of course, that exceptions to the Dalley
Rule have been created where the driver's viBw of the
stationary object in the collision was in some way obstructed, e.g. smoke, mist and headlight glare in Moss
vs. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 "Ct. 253, 98 Pac. (2d)
363; the blinding headlights in Neilson vs. Watanabe, 90
Ut. 401, 62 P.ac. (2d) 117; the dense fog in Trimble vs.
U. P. Stages, 105 ct. 457,142 Pac. (2d) 67±; and the curve
in the road in Hodges vs. Waite, 2 Utah (2d) 152, 270
Pac. (2d) 461. However, in the case at bar by the appellant's own admission, there was no obstruction to the
driver's view of the stopped vehicle of respondent, immediately prior to the accident, and therefore, nothing
to take the case out of the operation of the Dalley rule.
Two post-Dailey cases, Olson v. D. & R. G. R. R.,
98 Ut. 208, 98 Pac. (2d) 9±±, and Horsley vs. Robinson,
112 Utah 227, 186 Pac. (2d) 592, have recognized that
the Dalley rule is not limited to the concept that a person
operating .a vehicle on the highway must drive at a
speed at which it is possible to stop within the range
of apparent visibility. The court, in the latter case, in
commenting on Nickolerozwulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Ut. 465,
214 Pac. 304, stated at page 598 :
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"We held that defendant was negligent as
a matter of law, no matter how dark and stormy
the night or how bad the visibility, if he drove
at such a rate of speed that he was unable to
avoid running plaintiff down within the distance
plaintiff could be seen walking ahead of defendant's car on the highway. To the same effect see :
Dalley vs. Mid-W e.stern Dairy Products Co., 80
Ut. 331, 15 P. 2d 309, Haarstrich v. Oregon Short
Line Co., 70 Ut. 552, 262 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston,
61 Utah 358, 213 Pac. 791."

"The Nickoleroporulos vs. Ramsey case is in
substance a holding that it is negligence to operate
a vehicle on the highway at any time withottt
having it under sufficient control so that others
using the highway will not be unreasonably endangered thereby, regardless of how slow it is
required to travel to acc01nplish that end." (Emphasis ours) .
The case of Wright vs. Maynard, 120 Ut. 504, 235
Pac. (2d) 916, cited by the appellant, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar and from the Dalley case.
In Wright vs. Maynard, the defendant driv,er struck a
moving object (the plaintiff), while avoiding the parked
vehicle on the ro.adside. In both the case at bar and the
Dalley case the parked vehicle was struck. The logic
of Wright vs. Maynard supports the position of the
respondent in the case at bar. In Wright vs. Maynard,
the question of defendant's negligence was held to be
one of fact for the jury because, although the defendant
was not able to stop in time to .avoid the collision, he
had sufficient control of his automobile to turn out and
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thu.s avoid collision with the stationary obstruction. In
the case at bar, appellant neither stopped nor turned
out, but continued blithely into collision with respondents' vehicle without offering any plaussible excuse whatsoever for doing so.
The following language from Dalley vs. Midwestern
Dairy Prochtcts at 15 Pac. (2d) 311, is particularly pertinent to the case at bar :
" ... A.s plaintiff approached the place where
the truck was standing on the night in question,
the highway was straight and level for a distance
of at least a mile. The truck was directly in front
of him and in his course of travel. According to
his testimony he was keeping a constant lookout
ahead. If he was not keeping a lookout ahead, he
was guilty of negligence in failing to do so. There
was nothing to obstruct his view. It was an
ordinary, clear, quiet summer night with no moon.
So far as appears there was nothing to divert
his attention from the road in front of him. He
knew he w.as traveling upon a highway that was
used by pedestrians, and persons traveling on
horseback and in horse-drawn vehicles, none of
whom are required to diselose a light to warn
others of their presence upon the highway. In
such case it must inevitably follow that plaintiff
did not keep a lookout ahead, or, if he did, he
either did not heed 'what he saw or he could not
see the truck becau.se his lights w'"ere not such as
were prescribed by law." (Emphasis ours.)
The facts of the case at bar are even stronger than
those in the Dalley case, because here respondents' vehicle
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was adequately equipped with lights indicating it,s presence, whereas in the Dalley case the defendant's truck was
completely unlighted and amounted to a trap for the
unwary motorist.
The fundamental fallacy of appellant's position is
that he fails to conceive that there are two facets to the
Dalley rule.
(,a) The operator must drive at such speed as to
be able to .stop or otherwise avoid substantial objects on
the highway within the distance illuminated by his headlights.
(b) He must s,ee and pay h.eed to what is there
to be seen. This latter facet is of course, not limited to
the Dalley ca.se, but applies to all driving situations. It
has been often recognized by this court and commented
on in other line.s of traffic cases such as open intersection
cases and pedestrian cases.
It would be an anomoly indeed if a plaintiff in one
case would be guilty of negligence as a matter of law
in failing to observe and ,avoid a wholly unlighted obstruction in a highway; while in another case where the
obstruction was lighted and observed by the plaintiff, it
should be held a jury question whether he w,as guilty of
negligence on the feeble excuse of "mistake of judgment." l\1any types of negligence are "mistakes of judgment," e.g. a driver entering an intersection in the belief
that he is ,ahead of another approaching from the right;
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a driver attempting a left hand turn in the belief that
approaching cars are not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. But where the mistake is as gross as
appe.ars here, no jury should be permitted to speculate
on its legal effect.
The appellant cites Smith v. Bennett, 1 Ut. (2d)
224, 265 Pac. (2d) 401, as supporting his contention that
mere errors of judgment are questions for the jury.
However, he overlooks an important qualification of the
rule of that case, as set forth in the opinion of the Court:
"A major dissimilarity exists between the
facts of the c.ase now before the court and plaintiff's authorities. In these cases we were concerned with situations such as intersectional accidents where the plaintiff's attention w~ demanded in more than one direction or in more
than one pl.ace. Since his attention could not be
in all places and in all directions at once, it was
a question of human judgment as to how his attention should he distributed among the several
competing demands. A question of fact for the
jury was presented as to whether his distribution
of .attention was reasonable.
"In the instant case there 1cas but one demand
upon plaintiff's attention. There is no room for
a reasonable difference of opi,nion as to where
her attention should have been concentrated; it
was incumbent upon her to observe the condition
of approaching traffic. That she failed to use due
care in doing so is manifest from the evidence."
(Emphasis ours.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
In the case at bar, appellant's driver saw the p.arked
truck of respondent some 400 feet ahead. He erroneously
concluded that the respondents' truck was moving. The
sole object requiring the attention of appellant's driver
immediately prior to the accident was the stopped truck
of the respondents. The driver's .attention should have
be·en solely on this object before him. Long before a
collision ocurred he should have recognized the true
situation and either stopped or turned out to avoid a
collision.
The appellant, (at page 10 of his brief), cites Davis
et al., v. Brown, 20 Wash. (2d) 219, 147 Pac. (2d) 263
as an example wherein a court, committed to the doctrine
of the Dalley case, recognized an "error in judgment"
distinction. However, the Washington Court was not
committed to the Dalley rule. In the case of M orehottse
vs. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157 (1926),
the Supreme Court of Washington definitely rejected
the Dalley rule. The Washington rule is wholly contrary
to the Utah rule, .and the Washington decision is of no
aid in the determination of the case at bar. Nor is there
any need to go beyond the pronouncements of this court
in seeking a solution to the problem.
The plaintiff would have us believe that no "judgment" was exercized in the Dalley, Fretz and Benson

(Benson vs. D. & R. G., 4 Ut. (2d) 28, 286 Pac. (2d) 790)
ca.ses. It is respectfully submitted that every conscious
human action requires the exercise of some degree of
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judgment, whether or not that judgment be erroneous,
or whether or not the action based on that judgment
be negligent. The cases heretofore cited establish a welldefined standard of conduct for persons operating vehicles on the highway during the night. As applicable
to this ca.se the objective standard may he stated thus:
A person operating a vehicle on the highway at night
must keep such control of his vehicle that will enable
him to stop and avoid obstructions that fall within his
VlSlOn.

Any violation of this objective standard of conduct
1s negligence as a matter of law. The "mere error of
judgment" of the appellant's driver coupled with the
speed of his vehicle led to a violation of this standard
of conduct - a failure to control the vehicle and avoid
the object within the range of vision. There could be
no more absolute breach of .a positive duty. Yet, the
appellant contends that the court should at this late
date accept a subjective test of "error in judgment" in
contraposition to a clear objective standard pr01nulgated
and many times reaffinned by our Court. \Ve have well
recognized exceptions to this objective standard of the
Dalley rule, but similarly these exceptions are based upon
objective extraneous factors, i.e. interference with visibility. On the other hand plaintiff proposes a subjective
modification of our rule based on "error in judgment".
Could not this san1e modification be grafted into every
objective standard of conduct which the court has laid
down 1 Regarding the use of "judgment" as a standard,
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Ju.stice Tyndal once said, "Instead ... of saying that the
liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the
judgment of each individual, which wouiJ..d be as v.ariable
as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought
rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all case·s
a regard to condition such as a man of ordinary prudence
would observe." Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468,
475; 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837).
In the case at bar we have a well est.ablished standard of care which a man of ordinary prudence should
observe. This standard of care has been violated. The
inevitable conclusion is that the appellant is guilty of
negligence as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The facts of this case bring it squarely within the
Dalley rule. The court below correctly concluded that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The judgment should be ;affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN
& CHRISTENSEN AND
JAMES A. MURPHY

Attorneys for Respondents.
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